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Introduction 
 There is a persistent scholarly and public perception of democracy as the only legitimate 
form of government among democratic theorists and American citizens.   If this perception exists 
in such a widespread fashion then it risks being accepted dogmatically and not on its merits and 
is thus deserving of re-analysis. John Dunn has explained this perception on the basis that today 
all states proclaim to be in the interests of the people.   If this is true, then the people in 1
democracies should be better off, as people’s interests can only be beneficial for them.  However, 
Dunn is clear in expressing a view which claims that democracy alone does not ensure just 
outcomes.  Taking this as potentially true, as it is at least the consensus view among modern 2
democratic theorists that democracy does not produce just outcomes one hundred percent of the 
time, then a critique of democracy would beg the question of how justice relates to the interests 
of the people.  Here the established normative approach would be to examine John Rawls and 
John Locke.  However, a much more influential group of democratic theorists provide a 
justification for democracy distinctly limited in its normative approach and would not view 
outcomes of government as the most essential aspect of legitimacy.  3
 The prolific democratic theorist Robert Dahl and a number of other democratic 
proceduralist theorists like Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson present the modern case for 
  John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1
1979), 1-3.
  John Dunn, Setting the People Free (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), 149.2
  Dunn himself recognizes Robert Dahl as one of the most influential scholars of democracy in the modern 3
era. John Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 11.
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democracy.   They aim to explain the requirements and purposes of democracy.  Their 4
viewpoints make up a widely accepted canon of theory pertaining to democracy, and for the 
purposes of this paper, democracy will mean the form of government Dahl describes and other 
proceduralists examine.  While Dahl is a democratic theorist who focuses on pluralism (the 
existence of sundry perspectives in a society that help build consensus), proceduralism is a 
connected concept.  Proceduralists argue that the process of democratic decision-making confers 
legitimacy upon those decisions and their resulting governmental actions.  Dahl is in agreement 
with this assertion and views democracy as an attainable and legitimate form of government.  5
 Voting in a democracy is essential to the expression of interests, and is the main form of 
political influence most members in a democracy have at their disposal.   It is a preference in the 6
representation of individual interests.  In selecting a candidate, a citizen voluntarily devolves 
decision making power onto another agent.  While not author of that representative’s ideas the 
citizen expects that representative to do what is best for the citizen.  Dahl expects the citizen to 
expect this because he assumes humans are rational beings that make decisions on the basis of 
their personal goals, their self-interest.  Through the accurate representation of all of society’s 
sundry interests democracy gives every individual equal power in collective decision making.  
 A pervasive societal belief in human equality marks this process as fair and just, as it 
gives everybody equal control of a power which affects all. Democracy is thus a just process for 
  I categorize these scholars together because they all emphasize the process of democracy as the most 4
important aspect of legitimacy.  Their views on the quality of that process do differ.  Dahl is a purist in assuming the 
skeleton of a participatory democracy is enough while Gutmann and Thompson require enlightened and respectful 
public discussion.  The association is acceptable here because of the dichotomy of process and outcomes, a 
dichotomy which over the course of the paper is examined more closely.
 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 311.5
  Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University 6
Press, 1961), 225-8.
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collective decision making and conducive to the citizenry’s acceptance of coercion in particular 
societal situations.  The acceptance of coercion, meaning an individual’s willingness to accept 
majority rules when that individual is in the minority, is the standard for determining if any state 
is legitimate.  In accepting laws an individual does not agree with, he is silently confirming the 
right of the state to enact and enforce them.  The laws may be wrong to that person, but the state 
is not wrong for imposing them.   The democratic process creates legitimacy because citizens in 7
certain societies view its emphasis on equal representation of interests as fair, and thus it is 
conducive to submission.   
 Proceduralism emphasizes just means and subsequently lacks a stated purpose for 
government in its ends, or perhaps assumes the end to be self-evident.  It cannot be that the 
purpose of the democratic process is to produce legitimacy since that would equate legitimacy 
with the democratic process, and thus be self-fulfilling.  A more reasonable explanation of 
purpose, given the modern scholarship on democratic theory, is that which John Rawls proposes 
for a well-ordered society.   This purpose is dependent upon a positive definition of human 8
freedom whereby environment and the availability of options is key to the existence of genuine 
liberty.  The aim of this state is to achieve public goods by shaping the environment to expand 
  While Rawls is primarily concerned with just outcomes, he admits that when governments enact unjust 7
laws civil disobedience is not an appropriate reaction.  He claims that individuals have a duty to support just 
institutions in-spite of a few unjust laws. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 293 and 308.
  While not focused on John Rawls, this paper argues that his theories concerning the importance of freedom 8
and equality of opportunity fit Robert Dahl’s views on property rights and freedom.
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human freedom.  The role of democracy, is then to achieve optimal utility in working for the 
interests of the majority.  9
 Within the later literature Dahl produces, like Democracy and its Critics, he grants the 
state vast powers because the state is a means to achieving freedom.  His only restrictions are on 
the subversion of political rights like free speech.  This idea clashes with traditional liberal 
values, which John Locke represents in this paper, of innate human freedom whereby sundry 
rights (especially those regarding property) protect that freedom from state interference.    10
 The power granted to a state in Dahl’s proceduralist conceptions of democracy and 
freedom is closely aligned with Hobbesian ideas.  The democratic state described above is in fact 
a Hobbesian democracy in purpose and form.  This purer form is in line with the nature of a 11
state in a Hobbesian conception. Within this realm of truth all states are inherently legitimate, all 
powerful, and designed to achieve security. Dahl’s democratic theory grants great power to the 
state for the purpose of achieving public goods on the basis of a positive definition of freedom, 
this conception fits into Hobbesian ideas of government.  
 The central argument of this paper is that the contemporary democratic theory of Robert 
Dahl is incorrect in its proposition that the democratic process produces legitimacy.  However, he 
is redeemed by the Hobbesian characteristics of his theoretical outlook and by the failure of a 
  Rawls views a proper distribution of resources as one where a safety net exists, where people have equal 9
opportunity, and where unequal distributions are allowed to exist if and only if those inequalities bring about a 
greater good for everyone else than would otherwise be the case.  Democracy in this conception falls into this 
perspective of utility and is seen as a just institution. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 65, 76, and 243.
  Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 169-73.10
  While Hobbes is a supporter of absolute monarchy he accepts the legitimacy of a democratic form of 11
government.  However, he considers the democratic form to be least efficient in its decision-making and thus 
flawed.  Flawed, because it cannot perform a states’ function of providing peace as optimally as an absolute 
monarchy. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:19:94-100, Edited by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1968), 239-45.
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Lockean normative approach in explaining the legitimacy of the United States.  An analysis of 
the legitimacy of the modern United States without reference to any theory demonstrates this. 
The U.S. is then reexamined in terms of voter participation and government treatment of 
property rights.  What is extracted form this analysis is that the United states is legitimate 
without conforming to either Dalian or Lockean theories on legitimacy.  In fact the analysis 
demonstrates that contemporary American democracy illustrates the essential truth of Hobbesian 
conceptions of government legitimacy. 
 Legitimacy in this paper is defined as individual acceptance (tacit or explicit) of societal 
coercion. Coercion is defined as the imposition of a societal decision on a party which did not 
desire that action to take place (hence the emphasis below on defining freedom).   The 12
acceptance of coercion demonstrates, on the individual level, the innate justice seen in the 
societal action.  If a state cannot enforce its laws or if its people will not follow the laws, then 
that state’s power is such that the state is irrelevant.  This creates instability.  A state’s decisions 
must be carried out for either the good of the society as a whole or the interests which are in the 
majority.  If this does not occur, a state’s existence is threatened.  If coercion is not accepted then 
war is a possible result.  The destructive nature of this instability is something to avoid. 
Legitimacy is thus important because it allows a state to function properly while preventing 
instability.  13
  The nature of human freedom is emphasized below because it relates to how humans can accept coercion. 12
Can one remain free while being coerced (forced) into a decision?  It is not the purpose to examine the truth value of 
these judgments on freedom, but merely to examine their outcomes and ensure that the theories take this essential 
concern logically into account.
  While Isaiah Berlin has criticized the modern focus on obtaining political stability, this aim is at the 13
foundations of all political theory since a perfect state should not be expected to fail.  In shaping the purposes of 
government, stability is an implied goal. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press. 
1969), 28-29.
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Review of the Literature 
 The debate on state legitimacy revolves around the concepts of just ends and just means. 
In attempting to describe and define exactly what legitimacy is, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy offers a generally accepted definition, in that it is widely implicit in the literature, 
that describes legitimacy as the acceptance of coercive power.  To determine how this result 14
comes about, the modern political philosopher Thomas Christiano frames the debate in terms of 
just ends (instrumentalists) and just means (proceduralists).  This distinction is simple, that 15
either the process of societal decision making is just and worthy of submission or the results of 
those decisions are just and thus worthy of the same.  
 There are a large number of democratic theorists who claim the democratic process alone 
produces legitimacy. These proceduralists, like Seyla Benhabib, Jurgen Habermas, Jane 
Masbridge, Benjamin Barber, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Frederick Schauer, see the 
actual discourse representation produces as the source of state legitimacy.  Gutmann and 16
Thompson express the essence of what makes this theory viable in their work, Democracy and 
Disagreement. For these authors, stability of the system requires acceptance of the system. By 
  Fabienne Peter, “Political Legitimacy,” the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014), edited by 14
Edward N. Zalta.
  Thomas Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004), 15
260.
  Jurgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Democracy and Difference: Contesting 16
Boundaries of the Political, Edited by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24; Jane 
Mansbridge, “Using Power/ Fighting Power: The Polity,” Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the 
Political, Edited by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 51-3; Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a 
Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political, 
Edited by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 69; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: 
Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xi; Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 12-3 and 93; Frederick 
Schauer, “Talking as a Decision Procedure,” Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement, Edited 
by Stephen Macedo (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18.
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creating an environment of open communication, parties can better understand each other. Even 
if both parties can not reach an agreement, stability is maintained by the knowledge of and 
respect for the opposing viewpoint. This can only obtained through fair and open discussion.  17
The idea of associativism within the literature on legitimacy stresses that one’s natural social ties 
to neighbors, family, and coworkers bring about loyalty to the nation. Opposing this is a 
reductionist viewpoint which Christopher Wellman expresses. Wellman argues that a human 
search for justice governed by proximity leads to societal binding and the resolve to bring about 
intrastate economic equality.   While relevant, these views are less widespread. 18
 Dominant among democratic theorists is Robert Dahl. Dahl sees the process of allowing 
the accurate representation of interests, which only democracy provides, as the foundation of an 
inherently just and legitimate state.  As a result, he is in agreement with proceduralists in that 19
the democratic process is conducive to legitimacy. With every individual represented, discussion 
and majority rule can hold society accountable to the law. This focus on interests has seen 
pushback. The socialist Irving Howe argues that democracy cannot be maintained by corrupting 
private interest.  Bruce Douglas argues that representing interests is harmful and that individuals 20
must make decisions based on what is believed to be the common good instead of what is 
 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University 17
Press, 1996), 93, 346-7 and 361.
  Christopher Wellman, “Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is there Magic in the Pronoun ‘My’?” 18
Ethics 110, no. 3 (April, 2000), 537-8 and 542.
  Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 37-8, 70-1, 164, and 19
180.
  Irving Howe, “Socialism and Liberalism: Articles of Conciliation?” The Relevance of Liberalism, Edited by 20
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Seweryn Bialer, Sophia Sluzar, et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 45.
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beneficial to the individual.  Supportive of all viewpoints in a general sense, is a Rawlsian 21
influenced idea brought up by Jeremy Waldron who argues for a natural duty towards a just state, 
that any state that is just is deserving of a person’s submission to coercion.  Whether justice is 22
found in means or ends a just state deserves a kind of natural allegiance. There is also a statist 
mentality that Christopher Wellman is supportive of, which argues on the basis of a cost benefit 
analysis that states deserve allegiance because they provide society with many unique and 
necessary goods.  All of these modern viewpoints however, demonstrate the contemporary 23
starting point of subjective moralists in that these arguments are logical but do not seek to 
explain the justice each theory depends upon. 
 Few theorists attempt to define justice and emphasize the ends of the process as 
important. Dahl argues against restricting the powers of the state to allow for interests to win out. 
He argues that this pure democratic process will ensure stability. The foundations for such a 
mindset fit perfectly into Fishkin’s theories on modern moral subjectivism and Berlin’s 
descriptions of modern thought which emphasizes stability.  These types of means-based 24
arguments conflict with classical liberals like John Locke who assigns specific moral instructions 
as to the purpose of a state. If a state protects the lives, liberties, and property of its subjects then 
 Bruce Douglass, “The Common Good and the Public Interest.” Political Theory 8, no. 1 (February, 1980), 21
105-7.
  Jeremy Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (Winter, 22
1993), 27.
 Christopher Wellman and John Simmons, Is there a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge: Cambridge 23
University Press, 2005), 5-6.
 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 28-9 and 34. 24
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that state is just and legitimate.  A state that does not produce those ends is inherently unjust and 25
citizens can justifiably revolt.  John Rawls is among the few modern theorists to propose such an 
ends-based normative argument in asserting “justice as fairness” as the ultimate claim of a state’s 
purpose, proposing  justice in the form of political equality and equal economic opportunity as 
the ends of a just state.  However, he claims this to be a neutral starting point consistent with the 26
theoretical orthodoxy Fishkin describes in Beyond Subjective Morality.  Among historical 27
theorists there are also those with a conception of liberty which does not rely on democracy, 
namely Thomas Hobbes. A legitimate state for Hobbes is one which has the power to prevent 
civil war.  Although every government is legitimate, the best state would be undemocratic 28
(preferably a monarchy) and contain absolute and unmixed power over its citizens based on the 
needs the state of war makes apparent.  This is contradictory to the makeup of modern 29
democratic theory. Within the literature there is a general acceptance of the idea that legitimacy 
requires the acceptance of coercion, and there is consensus among the modern theorists that the 
democratic process produces this. However, there is disagreement with historical theorists which 
base their just outcomes on moral principles, like between Locke who finds legitimacy in the 
ends of government and like Hobbes who sees democracy as inefficient to the purpose of a state. 
 John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, 9:123 (Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, 1947), 139.25
  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 4-7.26
 Ibid., 9-1127
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:21:108, 2:17:87-88, and 2:21:109-110, Edited by C.B. Macpherson 28
(London: Penguin, 1968), 263, 226-7, and 265.
 Ibid., 2:19:94-97 and 2:18:88-94, 228-34, 236, 239-243.29
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 The literature on democracy presents a highly contested field where some positions are 
self-fulfilling. Proceduralists like Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson see the process of 
discussion only available to a democracy as the only source of legitimacy and thus democracy as 
the only legitimate government. No external explanations of justice or liberty are needed in this 
framework. The process allows human beings to accept coercion because they see it as fair. In 
the search for legitimate government then, democracy is the only possible outcome. John Rawls 
also finds that the process of democratic decision making is integral to state legitimacy as a 
society must produce political equality to be just.  The most direct way of producing political 30
equality is through a democratic state where collective decision making is occurring. Robert 
Dahl is of the same opinion as Rawls in terms of political equality. Democracy is the only 
legitimate government because it allows the representation of all interests within a society and 
those interests are only properly represented when each individual is politically equal.  The 31
result of such a state whose purpose is to represent interests, is that only political rights are 
recognized. Beyond political rights, the existing majority interest is the only limitation on state 
power. Dahl does not even recognize property rights in this conception of democracy.  What 32
brings this type of pure democracy about is a democratic society which believes in equality.  So 33
for Dahl, politics is an expression of underlying societal beliefs and democracy only thrives 
when the correct culture is participating.  
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4-7.30
  Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 70-1, and 89.31
  Ibid. 169-73.32
  Ibid. 30, 168, and 17833
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 There are also some minor arguments which play a role in these larger concepts. There is 
a discussion of representation which Hanna Pitkin takes up. Representation is key for Dahl and 
others who see citizen’s interests being voiced in a democracy as important. Since representation 
is not ownership of the ideas themselves, but approval of an author of ideas, all representation 
remains idealistic.  Contrary to a pure agency view of representation, is Edmund Burke’s idea of 34
a trustee who the electorate leaves alone to make decisions for them.  However, Pitkin rejects 35
this idea of representation as too far from a true definition of representation. She also sees the 
vigilance needed to ensure pure representation of interests as impractical, and so argues that 
representatives should be chosen based on a few key interests and then let alone.36
Robert Dahl and Proceduralist understandings of Democracy and Government 
 Many modern political theorists concerned with democracy assert that the democratic 
process itself produces social acceptance of coercion.  The production of understanding through 
debate is at the core of this assertion.  When democracy exists, people’s views are represented in 
the process of societal decision making.  The results of these collective decisions will have 
effects for all members of that society and so are important on the individual level.  In providing 
each person the opportunity for others to hear and discuss their opinion in the process of making 
a societal decision that person is contributing to the production of laws that could either help or 
hamper society as a whole in terms of economy and justice.  When a decision is not reached in 
an individual’s favor, the decision still applies to him.  In this scenario, the thing that makes that 
  Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 17.34
  Ibid., 127 and 160-9.35
 Ibid., 31, 190-1, 209, and 238-9.36
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individual accept the inevitable coercion (the taking on of a behavior which they do not want to) 
is the the process from which that coercion stems.   
 Through discussion, individuals present arguments and defenses which make clear to 
others their beliefs.  The back and forth of debate tests one’s ideas.  The approval or disapproval 
of those ideas depends upon the force of reason which is placed behind them, in convincing 
others the ideas are valid. For those who are not swayed into changing their positions, or in 
situations where deadlock persists, discussion still produces beneficial results for the 
participants.  The process promotes an understanding of different viewpoints.  This 
understanding allows an acceptance of an idea’s basic legitimacy to exist.   What is meant by 37
this is that whether issues of fact or not, or supported by fact, one cannot assume any longer that 
an argument is invalid, but that it is a rational idea produced by other rational humans.  As a 
result, it is given its due respect as a plausible alternative solution.  Within the democratic 
framework where any idea has the potential for the state to accept and enforce it, and through 
understanding, individuals can come to respect the coercion they face as well as their opponents’ 
viewpoints. 
 Democracy functions in the above manner when individual interests are represented as 
accurately as possible.  The ideas which are presented in democratic discussion are those which 
inescapably come from individual human interest.  The idea that democracy is built upon the 
representation of individual interests is itself built upon a general idea of mankind.  Man 
 For discussion to produce its legitimating results, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson propose three 37
requirements the process must contain.  The moral arguments proposed in discussion must contain the principle of 
reciprocity, which involves basic cultural understanding of the claims which are relevant to where they are being 
produced.  They also require publicity to allow society to hear and to judge arguments openly.  The third principle is 
accountability, citizens must be able to hold public officials accountable. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 12-14 and 93.  
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instinctively seeks after his own survival and behaves in a manner which he believes to be in his 
self-interest.  Ever-present in human beings is the desire to achieve ends which promote this 
accepted purpose.  The result of this is that all rational human thought and action is based upon 
what is in the interest of the individual.  It is impossible for human beings to think otherwise, so 
an individual behaving on the basis of the idea that societal interests trump individual ones 
conflicts with what is innate and inescapable in humanity.  Societal decision making cannot help 
but take individual interests into account because they are the only ones that exist. 
 In order for the process of democracy to work the state must represent individual 
interests.  Dahl refers to a state containing sundry blocks of interests (like that of the United 
States) as a polyarchy. The representation of interests are good because people are more in tune 
with what will benefit them.  Dahl writes,  
Let us assume that an adult person is more likely, as a general rule, to 
understand his or her personal interests better than another person…If the 
general good were composed only of individual interests, and if we could 
also agree on a satisfactory principle for aggregating individual interests—
a majority principle…To reach the best possible collective decision about 
the general good we would need only to ensure that everyone had an 
adequate opportunity to express a choice among alternatives (say, by 
casting a vote) and that the process of arriving at the collective decision 
followed a rule for aggregating these individual choices into a public 
choice (say, by a majority principle).  38
All that exists is individual interest, which people are adequate at discerning.  What results from 
this is that general good must necessarily be composed of individual interests.  Through voting 
and a majority principle individual interests are aggravated into the public good.  By allowing the 
representation of interests to occur as accurately as possible, all ideas are given a role in the 
discussion and the potential for the state to enact them.  They are also given a chance for the 
 Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 70-1.38
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public to understand, and for the owners of the ideas, who are tuned into the discussion because 
their interests are at stake, to achieve understanding.  By representing all individual interests 
everyone in society is given a role in the legitimizing process, which allows for the acceptance of 
societal decisions, even by those in the minority.  Since individual interests are the only interests 
that can exist, they represent the ideas which must be represented in the discussion which 
democracy promotes.   By producing an inclusive discussion the process of democracy 39
produces legitimacy. 
 To insure that representation of interests occurs Dahl accepts restrictions on government’s 
subversion of political rights. The democratic process produces the legitimacy required for a 
state and therefore a society to function.  This process is accomplished through the accurate 
representation of interests.   However, political rights are required for representation of interests 40
to occur.  If people do not have the same institutionalized rights as everyone else to voice their 41
opinion in a debate with the possibility of affecting change in their interest, then the democratic 
process is destroyed.  There is no longer a need to come to an understanding or to engage in a 
debate if some interests do not get a fair voice in determining a societal decision.  Equality in 
political rights is essential for legitimacy and for majorities and minorities to form based on 
understanding of true interests and of others’ interests.   
 The protection of political rights is ensured by restricting government.  To protect 
political rights requires equality of the value of a person’s vote, equality of the opportunity to 
vote, and the freedom to speak and to publish freely.  The value of a person’s vote does not 
 Ibid., 70-1, 164, and 180.39
  Ibid., 60 and 70-71.40
  Ibid., 169-73 and 175.41
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simply depend upon one person one vote, but on the vote’s equal importance in societal decision 
making.  Currently, Dahl sees problems in the United States’ system of representation embodied 
by the Senate, the electoral college, and gerrymandering.   By allowing equal representation of 42
the senate, states with smaller populations receive greater say than their numbers demand.  There 
are no major state interests that are threatened today which are based upon the size of a state, and 
thus there is no clear reason why this should continue.   There are issues today with the 43
opportunity to vote.  Currently, the U.S. requires voter registration.  It is known that registration 
lowers turnout for those who are relatively poor, as well as the undereducated.  By requiring 
registration, low voter turnout among these groups is promoted so that accurate representation of 
interests in the federal system is hampered.  Registration is an unequal burden for 44
underprivileged groups, and the same factor is in play with developing voter I.D. laws which 
require government photo I.D. at polls.   Freedom of speech is a well-protected requirement in 45
the United States.  Freedom House, a non-governmental organization which evaluates freedom 
of speech in individual countries, rates the U.S. as free in both the press and the internet (giving 
scores of 22/100 and 19/100 respectively, lowest being best).   Freedom of speech is integral to 46
  Robert Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 42
79-81 49-53 171-3.
  Ibid., 86.43
 G.E. Mitchell and C. Wlezien,  “The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration: Turnout and the 44
Composition of the American Electorate,” Political Behavior 17, No.2 (1995), 184; B. Highton and R. Wolfinger, 
“Estimating the Effects of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,” Political Behavior 20, No.2 (1998), 80 and 
98.
 M.R. Hershey, “What we know about Voter-ID Laws, Registration, and Turnout,” Political Science and 45
Politics 42, No. 1 (2009), 87-90.
  The U.S. has issues with journalist access to national security related documents. The public is also 46
questioning whether privacy is necessary for freedom of speech to exist, as the government’s widespread data 
collection on its citizens has recently raised public concerns. “Freedom of the Press: United States, 2015” and 
“Freedom of the Net: United States, 2015,” Freedom House. Accessed December 23, 2015.
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allowing proper representation because it allows for the expression of private viewpoints in the 
process of selecting representatives and in the process of collective decision making which 
representatives carry out. Political freedoms are provided to produce a just government and are 
protections which stand above politics so that one group cannot use government coercion to 
exclude another group from aiding in the determination of collective action. If this were allowed 
to occur, the legitimacy of the democratic process would be in jeopardy. 
 Representation is an integral component of this concept of a functioning democracy.  Two 
forms persist in the type of representation possible, the trustee and the delegate model.  The 
trustee model finds its appearance in the mind of Edmund Burke who considered it the only 
proper form of representation.   The trustee is essentially a person with control over his ideas 47
and values, who the people select to make decisions for them.  This model’s idea is, that by 
placing the representative above the vicissitudes and passions of the people he can be free to 
make the right decisions which takes into account primarily the public good.   This 48
representative is chosen for his demonstrated skill and perceived value.   
 In the delegate model of representation the representative is simply the voice box of the 
people. The public selects him based on his commitment to represent the majority interest of his 
electorate on each issue.  By doing this, his moral authority and individual ideas are subverted by 
the ideas of the populace.  This requires open communication between the representative and his 
electorate.  His decisions are not his but the voice of the people he represents. 
 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 47
168-9.
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 The above-detailed conception of democracy favors the delegate model.   In having 49
representatives act as the agents of their electorates the people are given both an outlet closer to 
the point of decision-making and more accurate representation of interests.  Whether the people 
consider long term vs. short term interests priority is irrelevant to the accurate portrayal of 
individual interests in government.  The representative cannot correctly judge and should not 
vote against the electorate's interests.  The representative’s job in this model is to portray 
accurately the will of his electorate.  The goal of representation in democracy as described above 
is to achieve legitimacy through the accurate representation of individual interests.  The 
representative form required by this democracy is that of the delegate. 
 While this Dahlian form of democracy does restrict government actions in the realm of 
political rights necessary for accurate representation, it sees any other limitations as 
inappropriate.  The goal of democracy is to create societal stability through legitimizing 
government action.  Through the acceptance of coercion, individual’s allow the government to 
accomplish the public will.  While the goal is stability it seems there is an understanding of 
societal change.   Social values may wander and individual interests may change.  It then 50
becomes counterproductive to government’s purpose to restrict the actions of a collective.  To 
restrict what is possible to achieve may create a dangerous handicap for the formation of state 
legitimacy.   If a majority can come to an agreement on a collective action which will benefit a 51
majority’s interests on the individual level, to not be able to carry that out would certainly lead to 
frustration towards the system itself.  Such a result is counterproductive to the legitimating 
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process of democracy in this view as it disrupts the legitimate expression of collective decisions, 
the whole point of which is to achieve positive actions to form legitimacy and expand freedom. 
No restrictions on governmental power, other than the protection of political rights, is legitimate, 
because it disrupts the pure functioning of a democracy in producing collective decisions.  In 
essence, allowing government to have near-absolute power allows for fluidity in societal 
ideology and interests, protecting the legitimizing process of democracy.   
Dahlian Democracy as a Hobbesian State 
 The essential features of this democracy illustrate a Hobbesian form of government.  The 
purpose of this democratic government relies upon Hobbesian conceptions of human nature.  To 
ensure the proper function of government Dahl provides the state with unlimited power in his 
model for democracy.  The only restrictions are political, which are simply necessary for this 
form of government to exist. People need the capability to choose their representatives, without 
that power the state would not be a democracy.  Unlimited power is a defining feature of 
Hobbesian conceptions of government.  Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth century political thinker, 
argues that the nature of a state is absolute and that absolute power is the essence of government. 
Thinking along these lines, any restrictions placed on a state are merely the phantasmal morality 
of that time claiming to be universal and true.  For Hobbes, the truth of such assertions are 
impossible to know and so the restrictions are the momentary beliefs created by the mind which 
mask the essential truth of the matter of power.   Government power is absolute and all 52
restrictions on that power are the weak beliefs of society, which, when confronted with the 
reality of the purpose of a state, can be assumed to falter.  For Hobbes, the formation of a society 
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and government is about survival.  Fear, produced from the threat to one’s life in a state of 
nature, drove man into society, the purpose of a state is thus to protect that life.  Anything which 53
inhibits the carrying out of that purpose is thus a flaw and can be considered fleeting when a 
society’s ideals face the reality of nature and war.  Dahl’s democratic theory has a basis in 
Hobbesian premises of human nature which invariably leads to his views on state power. 
 To begin a discussion of this connection a proper understanding of Hobbe’s conception of 
two key aspects of humanity, freedom and self interest, are required. 
 Thomas Hobbes’ view of freedom is practical and positive as it is focused on the physical 
world, but it is also constrained in that the urge to live binds man’s freedom.  Hobbes very neatly 
and clearly defines freedom, saying in Leviathan, “by Liberty, is understood, according to the 
proper signification of the the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, 
may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would,” and that, “A Free-Man, is he, 
that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he 
has a will to.”   Liberty is found not in the mind and the will to act but in the ability to act upon 54
what the mind wills.  This definition results in a very practical idea of freedom.  It is an 
observable definition as David Gauthier, a Hobbesian scholar, describes, “liberty…must be 
defined as potential power unimpeded by external conditions.  A man or a thing has the liberty to 
move in some way, if and only if it could now move in that way under actual external 
conditions.”  So if one desires to move from a chair to a bed, they are only free to do this if they 55
 Ibid., 1:14:68 and 2:21:108, 196-7 and 262-3.53
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have the unrestrained physical ability to move, not simply the will to.  To elaborate on this 
Hobbes says,  
the first foundation of natural Right is this, That every man as much as in 
him lies endeavor to protect his life and members.  But because it is in 
vaine for a man to have a Right to the end if the Right to the necessary 
meanes be deny’d him; it followes, that since every man hath a right to 
preserve himself, he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means, 
and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.    56
Man has a natural right to protect himself, but the means to do this are naturally deficient in 
everyone, so man also has the right, is free, to do whatever he can do to protect himself (a similar 
prescription he eventually allows for the combination of men, a state).    The idea of natural right 
is introduced here which, prefaced by Hobbes’ view on the most impelling aspect of mankind, 
produces great effects on his view on man’s freedom.  Hobbes believed that all of man’s actions 
are naturally oriented towards personal survival.  The natural laws are the products of this as 57
Hobbes explicates this term saying, “the Law of Nature, that I may define it, is the Dictate of 
right Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the 
constant preservation of Life, and Members.”   Man discovers natural (described as divine) laws 58
through reason and experience of a life centered on survival to enable survival.   His views on 59
natural right, are most consequential for man’s freedom as they guide it. Contrary to Hobbes’ 
definition of “law,” the laws of nature serve a more advisory role.   Since, “every man as much 60
  Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1:1:7-8, Edited 56
by Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 47.
  Hobbes, Leviathan, 1:14:66 & 2:21:11-12, 192 & 268-9.57
 Hobbes, De Cive, 1:2:1, 51.58
 Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 36-37.59
  Ibid., 29, 39, and 67; Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, 1:2:1, 51-52.60
Edward Scheirer Page    of  22 61
as in him lies endeavor to protect his life,” every man’s freedom is constricted to achieving 
objectives pursuant to this end.   Hobbes’ view on freedom is one where physical and external 61
impediments take primacy over the importance of having an internal/mental will, but this 
freedom does have a natural aim which is towards the survival of the individual which, through 
experience and reason, culminates into natural laws meant to be the best means to this end. 
 Since for Hobbes man is most free when he lacks external impediments and because 
man’s will is aimed at survival while lacking the appropriate means, Hobbes’ state of nature is a 
state of war, as men, being equal, seek justly to domineer over others to gain the means to the 
ends of their freedom.   Since man is in this competition with itself Hobbes concludes his idea 62
of the state of nature by saying, “it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common 
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a 
warre, as is of every man against every man.”  Man finds himself in an endless state of 63
competition for the means of his survival and thus life in the state of nature for Hobbes is 
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”  The result of this is that man, driven by fear, gives 64
up his freedom to a government in order to protect what his liberty was aiming at anyway, his 
life, as Hobbes states, “but as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves 
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made 
Artificiall Chains.”  Law now binds man’s will and produces subjects.  This state is best when it 65
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is strong as to keep men from devolving back into the state of nature, so man must give up his 
expansive will to the state.  Thus the sovereign can take a subject’s life without cause and it will 
still be just, as the subject has given the state the freedom to do so in order to ensure peace.  66
 Absolute power also assumes a purpose for its establishment which is not expressly 
stated in the logic of Dahl.  Hobbes assumes survival is man’s instinctive motivation and 
purpose.  As he says, “The final Cause, End or Designe of men (who naturally love liberty, and 
Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see 
them live in common-wealths) is the foresight of their own preservation.”   The end of 67
government, what Hobbes calls a commonwealth, is the security of individual life.  Survival 
depends in a state of anarchy (where society does not exist) on absolute individual freedom.  This 
is freedom which is dependent on man’s innate capabilities and upon the environmental factors 
which set the stage for either limiting or expanding the potential options.  Freedom is in the 
ability to make a decision and act in accordance with that decision.  This action may be rational 
or not, but the principle of survival is expected to guide it.  Man’s freedom is always the same in 
the sense that it is tied to the will, which for Hobbes is the last decision which produces action.  68
However, a man who is physically restrained is not free.  Freedom depends not on the existence 
of consequences but on the ability found in the natural limbs of mankind to put into action one’s 
will.  Thus, even under a government which wields absolute power over one’s life, a person can 
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be free.   The law sets consequences for undesired actions and one can decide whether or not to 69
follow that law knowing the existence of coercive consequences.   
 The freedom found under government mimics the freedom found in nature.  In nature, 
man is absolutely free, even to take another man’s life.  He rules the world and controls 
everything which his physicality can grip.  The only way to fight such freedom and potential for 
injustice is a state with the same power over its citizens.  Anything less would weaken the state 
and promote its own destruction by inherently voracious and opportunistic man.  A restricted 
government within this framework is no government at all because it promotes civil war.   The 70
prevention of a state of war and its concomitant injustices being the purpose of government, a 
restricted government is thus undesirable and unnatural.  For Hobbes, all governments stem from 
the same origins (war in the state of nature) and thus one should legitimately expect them to 
wield the appropriate power to fulfill their purpose.   Hobbes states, “And because the End of 
this institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End , has 
right to the Means; it belongeth of Right to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the 
Sovereignty, to be Judge both of the means of Peace and Defence.”  Government power is 71
absolute.  The origins of government determine its power and its purpose.  These are the essence 
of government for Hobbes and as a result of this he views all governments as legitimate as he 
accepts that there are multiple forms of commonwealth.  Hobbes defines Commonwealth as 
“One Person of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made 
themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he 
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shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.”   This one person is the leviathan 72
of sovereignty which he views as an artificial man.  Just before he defines his commonwealth he 
states, “man should say to every man, I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, 
to this Man, or to this Assembly of men…This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is 
called a Common-Wealth…This is the Generation of that Great Leviathan.”   The Leviathan to 73
which he refers is first referenced in his introduction where he states, “For by Art is created that 
great Leviathan called a Common-Wealth, or State.”  The several forms government can take is 74
insubstantial to its legitimacy because all states contain the same origins, purpose, and power, all 
states are legitimate.  This is why in his analysis of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy he 
accepts them all as different forms of commonwealth, saying “the Sovereignty is either in one 
Man, or in an Assembly of more than one.”  While he views all government as containing the 75
same essences, he views monarchy as the best because he believes it able to accomplish a state’s 
purpose most efficiently.  So, not only is absolute power required it is a feature of every 76
legitimate government. The state of nature being so violent and unproductive of man’s purpose, 
man was willing to give up his expansive will, to subvert himself to government, in order to 
better protect his life.   It is through contract that government was established, and that contract 77
granted absolute power to a state as well as required the state to seek to keep the peace. All states 
are legitimate in their role as peace-keepers and all states are absolute. 
  Ibid., 2:17:88, 225-7.72
  Ibid., 2:17:87, 225-7.73
  Ibid., Introduction, 81.74
  Ibid., 2:19:94, 233.75
 Ibid., 2:19, 233-40.76
  Ibid.,77
Edward Scheirer Page    of  26 61
 In establishing a government with absolute power based upon representing individual 
interest Dahl assumes a Hobbesian conception of state purpose.  A state’s purpose cannot be to 
produce legitimacy.  This presumes the existence of a state whereby collective decisions are 
made.  To agree that individuals must participate in government also does not satisfy an 
appropriate explanation of purpose because this very action makes democracy inevitable through 
circular logic.  To say a state’s purpose is to represent interests accurately is to require a 
democratic form.  The state itself becomes the purpose.  Man needs a state to achieve democracy. 
This is an illogical, not to say unfulfilling, explanation for the existence of states and the 
requirement for legitimacy.  
 To allow for absolute power Dahl may be attempting to leave the question of purpose 
open for society to figure out on its own.  This would say that a true conception of state purpose 
is perhaps unattainable and so man should forget about it.  He is favorable to this point of view 
though he sees moral knowledge as inherently valuable, as he says  
Few moral philosophers, and probably not many thoughtful and educated 
people, now believe that we can arrive at absolute intersubjectively valid, 
and “objectively true” moral judgements, in the same sense that we 
understand propositions in the natural sciences and mathematics to be 
“objectively true.”…To say that moral inquiry does not lead to the 
discovery of objective and moral laws does not compel us to rush to the 
other extreme: that moral discourse is utterly “subjective.”  78
He doubts that there is “objectively true” moral knowledge but allows that moral judgments have 
value.  This value allows it to play a role in societal decision making.  However, with no clear 
moral knowledge absolute power may play a functional role in allowing society to determine 
purpose and to change it when that purpose seems to produce results which people do not desire. 
 Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 66-7.78
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What Dahl does seem to know is that human beings need democracy and that democracy is the 
only legitimate form of government.  This certainly goes against Hobbes who argues essentially 79
that all government is legitimate, but absolute monarchy is best.  However, the focus on the 
representation of interests reveals a conception of human nature.  In providing for legitimacy 
Dahl should expect democratic government based on represented interests to avoid civil war and 
promote stability.  If human’s have interests, what are they and why do they create instability 
when they go unrepresented?  The best explanation for this is Hobbes’ understanding of 
humanity.  Human beings do not think on the societal level or in a utilitarian fashion regardless 
of their ideals.  When utility faces the reality of life or death or even harm or benefit, people 
prefer to preserve their own lives and personal benefits.  The impact on others is muted by the 
benefits of remaining alive or experiencing other benefits (perhaps obtaining more property). 
Humans also have an innate right to take action that is in their interest.  When things occur which 
do not benefit them, they are free to take action, potentially producing radical change that further 
benefits them.  In the state of nature a man can kill another man and take that person’s property. 
He can eat that man’s food, use his bow, live in his home, and maybe even eat the other man.  He 
is free to behave in this manner if his body is capable of successfully carrying out this plan.  This 
right does not change upon entering into a society of other individuals.  In fact it becomes more 
clear to see as there is more opportunity to make war.  In the democracy Dahl describes this 
freedom is being carried out on the societal level without violence.  His democracy attempts to 
legitimize these unescapable realities and pits conflicting interests against each other in an 
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environment that allows resolution without violence.  Individual interest and absolute power 
combine to allow actions carried out in a state of nature to be done without violence.  
 This democracy has the potential to legitimize theft.  One does not want to go so far as 
murder (as in a majority desiring the extermination of a minority group) as this would be counter 
to Hobbesian ends for a state (though Dahl does not express explicit agreement with Hobbes’ 
view on the purpose of government). What is commonly known as theft is clearly something 
allowed under this comprehension of democracy. If property rights are not protected by a 
government with absolute power, then it is clearly in the majority’s interest to collect property 
from those in the minority.  These groups can naturally define themselves in a pre-existing 
society of economic inequality, however, identity formation and party identity can develop 
towards this goal on the basis of cultural phenomenon or experiences which relate to particular 
issues.  The minority in this situation of legitimate theft can easily be defined by wealth, cultural 
identity, or political identity.  Thus, there is clear potential for theft to occur.  
 Dahl does discuss property, but from the opposite point of view.  He assumes societal 
cohesion is more important in the instance of property than individual interest.  Dahl considers 
property as a political tool which illegitimately allows the rich to have an unequal control over 
the political process.  This is not however the result of economic inequality, but the type of 
representative democracy proposed given the above assumptions on human nature. In any event, 
the state Dahl constructs to promote the process of democracy allows the inevitable promotion of 
individual interest above societal interests, and promotes the potential for legitimizing theft. 
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 To understand Dahl’s views on freedom he must be put into context. A concept of human 
freedom holds huge implications for resulting state structure and purpose, as Hobbes’ philosophy 
demonstrates.  In regards to the state and freedom Dahl states, 
The democratic process, I have argued, is superior in at least three ways to 
other feasible ways by which people might be governed.  First, it promotes 
freedom as no feasible alternative can: freedom in the form of individual 
and collective self-determination, in the degree of moral autonomy it 
encourages and allows, and in a broad range of other and more particular 
freedoms that are inherent in the democratic process, or are necessary 
prerequisites for its existence, or exist because people who support the 
idea and practice of the democratic process are, as a plain historical fact, 
also inclined to give generous support to other freedoms as well.  80
A democratic state can produce and protect human freedom.  This freedom exists in a state which 
allows for political rights and where the state holds absolute power.  In such a government Dahl 
argues man is best suited to experience the greatest freedom.  Such a mindset is consistent with 
Kantian/Rawlsian formulations of freedom.  Isaiah Berlin, placed the concept of freedom into the 
context of positive and negative in explicitly political terms.   The negative form was protected 81
by limited government and the positive form was protected by active government.  Negative 
freedom takes the form of innate human capacity to carry out the will with limited external 
influence on that will.  Positive freedom depends upon one’s ability to enact the will and so its 
existence depends on external factors. Imanuel Kant first defines these concepts in this way in a 
general sense.  Negative freedom is dependent upon a self-generated will while positive freedom 
depended on the ability to carry out that will.   John Rawls accepts these two notions of freedom 82
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as true and in forming a society founded upon the principle of justice, Rawls argues that freedom 
must be taken into account.   In Rawls’ original position (where social and experiential 83
influences do not affect human objectivity) behind the veil of ignorance (where one does not 
know one’s position in society) humans’ common sense (or Kantian intuition) would deduce that 
personal liberty is a requirement for a just society, as everybody would see it as personally 
beneficial.   Rawls’ then goes on to argue for a state which promotes equal opportunity and 84
which allows economic inequality only when that economically favored individual produces 
greater benefits to society.   Equal opportunity expands the positive realm of human freedom in 85
that it opens up economic options which increase human ability to carry out their wills.  Such a 
state of existence is one which Dahl favors.   86
 Dahl’s views on property and an emphasis on political opportunity combined with the 
immense powers granted to government aim to advance the positive sense of human freedom. 
As illustrated by the quote above, democracy expands human freedom to the greatest degree. 
Innate negative freedom cannot be enhanced, only positive-related environmental factors can be 
enhanced in magnitude.  In creating an absolute state Dahl is giving society great ability to affect 
the enhancement of positive freedom.  In giving every person a say in government he is allowing 
participation to serve as protection for the negative sense of freedom.  This is the only realm 
where negative freedom has a chance to defend itself.  By participating, an individual can shield 
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his will from outside influence while participation in a state with absolute power can enhance his 
ability, and thus his positive freedom.   
 Such a conception of freedom is in essence Hobbesian.  Hobbes takes into account both 
forms of freedom but emphasizes it in the positive sense.  Freedom depends on action and action 
depends on will.  Since one who has reason can always will, freedom depends on external 
factors. These external factors can limit or expand human freedom in the positive sense.  Dahl 
views human freedom in the same way as Hobbes and allows for human freedom under absolute 
government.  Both create a purpose of government out of human freedom in that Hobbes 
requires living to be free and Dahl desires government to expand human freedom.  Dahl’s 
concepts of human freedom are essentially Hobbesian and he designs his democracy to protect 
negative freedom through participation and to enhance positive freedom through the absolute 
power of the state.   
 Dahl does not directly present a philosophy of freedom. However, the purpose of 
government surmised in his clearly illustrated Hobbesian conception of human nature requires a 
Hobbesian conception of freedom.  Freedom is essential to the crafting of a state for 
fundamentalist theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau because the nature of 
human freedom affects state legitimacy.  This is because it is related directly to the effectiveness 
of coercion.  If human freedom cannot exist in the presence of coercion than a government 
cannot be legitimate given the definition stated above.  Freedom needs to exist while in the 
presence of coercion for a state to be legitimate, otherwise no state is legitimate.  That is a 
conclusion hardly viable given the pervasiveness of government in human history.   
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 Freedom for Dahl is instrumental rather than intrinsic and utilitarian rather than 
individual.  Positive is the best description.  It is one that depends on environmental factors 
which limit what is possible and what decisions can actually be made.  One can will to fly but 
that person will just be jumping.  Similarly, a person in chains is not free because he can 
actualize very little of his will.  He can wiggle his toe but that’s about it.  Evidence of Dahl’s 
view on this matter is found in his treatment of property.   
 Property has the potential of producing political inequality and so Dahl suggests 
redistribution to remedy this.  He states this clearly in Democracy and its Critics, saying through 
the advocate’s voice in the dialogue,  
Ideally citizens would engage in political life as political equals…for 
citizens to be political equals would require that they have all the rights, 
obligations and opportunities implied by the criteria of the democratic 
process.  But…those rights duties, opportunities , and so on could not exist 
unless, for example, many crucial political resources were distributed 
pretty equally amongst them…I mean property, wealth, income, education, 
social status, information, and the like.  87
Dahl desires economic equality so that there would be equality of influence which would protect 
the sanctity of the democratic process.  Such an action would have the effect of increasing the 
opportunity available to currently less wealthy persons while limiting those of the wealthiest in a 
non-political and a political sense.  By increasing economic power and opportunity, freedom is 
being enhanced as more options become more readily available.  For instance, a person with a lot 
of savings is no longer dependent on his employer for survival and he can afford to take more 
risks which he hopes will increase his chances for prosperity and survival.  This is all arranged to 
ensure political equality, if people are equal in means they are equal in influence in a 
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representative democracy.   The connecting of property and freedom is something explicitly 88
done in a Rawlsian state designed to produce equal opportunity.  89
 An alternative conception of freedom which could function in this democratic context is 
one proposed by  Phillip Pettit.  Pettit argues on the basis of moral responsibility that a discursive 
conception of freedom is the most accurate description of human freedom.   By discursive, it is 90
meant that freedom is only found in a measure of control in collective decision making.  By 
having a say in societal actions one is free.  This makes sense given the starting requirement 
Pettit establishes for freedom, which is that it creates moral responsibility.   Such a requirement 91
is inherently social, it involves interactions between two humans which one can judge with the 
concepts of right and wrong.  The best way to be free in society then, is the ability to have 
control over collective decisions.  The problem with this concept is that it views society as the 
starting point, and not man.  Pettit establishes an artificial requirement to fulfill his desired result. 
His test does not consider the existence of individual freedom and as a result is flawed. 
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ends.  Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, “1976 preface” and “1953 preface,” Politics Economics and Welfare: 
Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1976), xxi-xxii, and xxixxlv-xlvii.
 Phillip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, (Oxford: Oxford 90
University Press, 2001), 64-68, 125-6, and 174.
  Ibid., 7-8.91
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 Both Dahl’s and Hobbes’ states function upon the same premises.  The unescapable 
reality that humans will consider individual interest first is central to these two theorists ideas of 
the state.  This supports the production of a state with absolute power to allow interests to thrive 
in both cases, just Hobbes’ assumes the interest of survival to be a state’s purpose.  The 
difference between these two is slight in that Dahl allows for the purpose to change but cannot 
expect much difference given his emphasis on individual interests  (since people’s interests are 
ultimately related to survival the state’s actions cannot be too distant from that aim).  Since this is 
the case it is easier to assume that the purpose of a state seems so obvious that it does not need 
stating.   The purpose has to be the protection of people’s welfare.  While the state is given 
agency with the power to set its own goals the essence of what a state is established to do stays 
the same.  Under this premise, absolute power is something more familiarly known as state 
police power.  In the ideal state all things are under the jurisdiction of this power and can be 
regulated by the state as it sees most beneficial to its goals, something which for Dahl the 
majority determines. It may be argued that Rousseau believed the state to contain absolute power 
wielded by the public in a democratic form.  However, this government made decisions through 
the general will, not individual interests.  The general will requires an interpretation of humanity 
which assumes innate morality which makes it capable for individuals to put the interests of 
society above that of themselves.   Starting from this premise produces an entirely different 92
quality of government while it is expected to stay similar in form (containing the components of 
absolute power and democracy). Like the inevitability of human freedom, all states require 
 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, 4:1:1,Translated by G.D.H. 92
Cole (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 271.
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absolute power to protect the safety of the public.  The most legitimate form of pure democracy 
which Dahl describes establishes such a conception of state purpose. 
Property Rights and its Lockean foundations 
 What has come before was an analysis of a powerful force in modern democratic theory. 
Dahl’s emphasis on process takes a side in a long running debate about whether a legitimate 
government must emphasize just ends or just means.  The foundations for Dahlian thought 
assume Hobbesian premises on human nature which make the process of democracy the most 
powerful legitimating force.  However, there is an opposing perspective on legitimacy which 
focuses on just ends.  In the modern liberal democratic society of the U.S. John Locke is the 
most relevant character to frame the normative argument for just ends.  
 In traditional liberalism, property is an essential source of conflict that helps establish a 
rational basis for state legitimacy.  The analysis of property begins with a definition describing 
how it exists and what its purpose is.  John Locke provides the easiest and most widely cited 
source for the principles of property within the realm of classical liberalism.  These 
understandings produce an outline of what one’s rights are concerning property.  Locke generally 
restricts this freedom to actions that do not affect another’s property.   Locke views these rights 
as essential to humanity and thus essential for a state to protect.  These rights then help direct the 
purpose of government to protecting them.  Thomas Hobbes’ perspective is opposed to this given 
the expansive power he grants the commonwealth to protect its members. Hobbes leaves no 
room for restrictions on government that protect individual property rights. The Dahlian 
perspective views these rights as undefined and open to changing attitudes through the 
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democratic process.  This also conflicts with the Lockean viewpoint.  Since he bases all state 
legitimacy upon the process of democracy itself, Dahl views property as subservient to the 
democratic process and thus recommends a more equal distribution of property so that some 
individuals will not have an unequal influence on the democratic process.   The subject of 93
distribution is a concern for Rawls but is also  a topic of interest amongst modern political 
scientists in regards to campaign finance. The question then becomes, how closely does the 
United States protect property rights? This question is taken up later in an analysis of U.S. 
legitimacy.  However, Locke’s ideas need further description to form a common basis for 
discussion. 
 Locke argues that the purpose of government is to protect mankind’s natural rights.   94
Natural  rights are universal expectations of individual power which are necessary for human 
existence.  Locke arrives at these rights by examining human nature in a classic thought 
experiment where he imagines man in a state of nature.  This natural state has no society or 
government and thus allows a demonstration of man’s pure nature.  From this scenario Locke 
argues that man is totally free, equal, and rational.  Man’s aim is survival, but the state of nature 
serves as an obstacle to that assurance since he is at risk of injustice from other men.  It is man’s 
capability to reason, which, when it controls the passions/instincts, makes man free.  This, 
combined with the obstacles of the state of nature, led to the formation of society.  Locke argues 
that human nature pursues existence as its goal while requiring freedom and property to obtain 
that goal.   Man can thus accept certain regulations which limit his ability to do injustice to 
 Augustus Dizerega, “Equality, Self-Government and Democracy: A Critique of Dahl’s Political Equality,” 93
The Western Political Quarterly 41, No. 3 (Sep. 1988), 463; Richard W. Krouse, “Some (Further) Dilemmas of 
Pluralist Democracy,” Yale Law and Policy Review 2, No. 1 (Fall, 1983), 174.
 Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, 9:123, 139.94
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others for the protection of that instinctual pursuit and its two necessities.  Thus government is 
given an explicit purpose and its adherence to that purpose creates its legitimacy.  As a result of 
this, Locke is willing to accept any form of government as legitimate so long as it is true to its 
ends.  For Locke specifically, Life, liberty, and property are man’s natural rights which man 95
established government to protect. 
 Property is essential to humanity.  By “essential,” it is meant that human existence is not 
possible without it.  For Locke, the simple act of eating lays a claim of property upon that item.  
It would be a contradiction to say that the food one eats to maintain life is at the same time yours 
and someone else's, it must be someones since the act of eating destroys its value to others.  To 
claim the former cooperative spirit would mean that it would be an injustice to eat and a virtue to 
starve.  In nature, Locke argues that everything was in common in this way, however the action 
of human labor produced the moral right to possess.   This basic argument of property makes it 96
an essential aspect of human life.  Property is necessary for survival and the protection of an 
individual’s property at the societal level is an important function.  97
 Locke elaborates on this theory to provide for situations of waste.  When man 
accumulates more than he can himself possess and use, then he discovers trade with an 
accompanying view of relative value.  This action goes hand in hand with Locke’s spoilage 
principle, that man should leave as much and as good for everyone else.   One could argue that 98
Locke is not in favor of the accumulation of wealth as this takes too much away from everyone 
  Ibid., 10:132-3, 141-2.95
 Ibid., 1:5:26-29, 88-9.96
  The notion of property goes beyond material possession for Locke as he describes speech, life, and ideas as 97
forms of personal property. Ibid., 5:24-6 and 9:123-24, 87-8 and 138-9.
 Ibid., 1:5:25, 36, and 46, 87, 92, and 97.98
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else while separating the individual from the labor which makes it his. While this may in fact be 
the result of the protection of property rights, Locke’s argument for trade logically deals with 
these concerns in that it is a tool to preserve the spoilage principle and requires labor.  Banking 
may be a harder corollary to defend on the basis of this principle, however, taking his basic view 
of property rights, where accumulations of the fruits of trade (less perishable objects of value like 
gold) are simply the accumulations of the fruits of labor in another form, banking is easily a 
legitimate function.   
 Locke’s treatment of property is holistic while it maintains a touch of common 
experience which makes it relatable.  One critique of it which Dahl would level upon it is that it 
is placed above the democratic voice which produces legitimacy.  While not Rawlsian in 
principle, since Rawls agrees that people in the original position would agree to some form of 
property rights with limits which would prevents excessive accumulation through inheritance, 
Dahl’s views the restrictions on property Rawls places on property as beneficial.  These 
restrictions include some form of redistribution efforts to provide for a social safety net as well 
as equal economic opportunity through state support of education and other means.   While 99
Rawls believes these restrictions as something people would see intuitively as just in the original 
position, Dahl views them as a way to counteract the issue of inequality of political influence in 
modern U.S. democracy.  This would then shore up the foundation of equality at the heart of the 
accurate representation of interests which for Dahl produces democracy and thus a legitimate 
state. 
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 65, 76, and 243.99
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 This concern for economic inequality is based on a concern for the strength of the 
democratic process.  Dahl originally viewed inequality of political influence as inconsequential 
for political stability as in his early works, like in Who Governs?, where Dahl argues that in a 
modern pluralist democracy (or “polyarchy,” as Dahl refers to it) different groups hold different 
resources, which he refers to as “resource fragmentation,” and thus their influence equals out.  
These resources include voting, money, and activism.  In his later works, like in Democracy and 
its Critics, he switches this view to state that economic influence through campaign finance is 
too influential and thus conducive to the production of governments which unjustly favor the 
interests of those who donate large sums.   Economic inequality threatens to produce inequality 100
of political influence which threatens the legitimacy of democratic government because the 
inequality of influence produces inaccurate representation of interests.  Modern scholarship 
along this thread has blossomed in the wake of the Supreme Court cases of Buckley v. Valeo, 
which equated money with speech, and McCutcheon v. F.E.C., which allowed unlimited 
contributions to pour into campaigns from unaffiliated Political Action Committees (PACs).   101
These Supreme Court cases illustrate exactly the problems with property rights which Dahl had 
when combining such rights with democracy.  If a person is allowed undue influence through the 
free use of his property on the democratic process, then their is the potential that the legitimacy 
of the state will become corrupted. The argument would then go that the United States has too 
  Dahl, Who Governs? 11, 89, 105, and 243; Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 324; Augustus Dizerega, 100
“Equality, Self-Government and Democracy,” 448 and 463
  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., No. 75-436, (1976), Cornell University Law School: Legal Information 101
Institute, Accessed February 26, 2016, 15 and 19-23; Shaun McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S., 
No. 12-536 (2014), 14-15 and 22-24.
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much protection for property rights because the expansive protections for the political use of that 
property threatens the virtue of the democratic process which provides for legitimacy. 
 The counter to this concern relates directly to the debate concerning legitimacy, as the 
democratic process is important in the above position insofar as the process produces legitimacy.  
If it is not the process which is conducive to legitimacy, then instability as a result of the 
protection of property rights would not occur.  Locke would thus stand upon his assumption of 
governmental purpose, which is to protect natural rights.  The protection of these rights is of a 
higher order concern than democracy, as detailed above.  As a result, the state must protect them 
in order to fulfill its purpose and thus remain legitimate.   
 With this discussion of the foundations of property in classical liberalism and the 
resultant consequences and arguments for and against its protection, it is now appropriate to 
move on to an analysis of the legitimacy of modern U.S. democracy. 
Legitimacy of U.S. Democracy 
 Today, political scientists face a dilemma when analyzing the United States.  It is a 
country with democratic mechanisms (interest groups and the right to vote) and institutions (the 
branches of state) which mostly fit with both early (easier to achieve) and late (more pure) 
Dahlian conceptions of state legitimacy in the form of democracy he requires.   Along with this 102
is a citizenry which views its government as legitimate and who overall approve of state actions.  
This is evident from John Dunn’s hypotheses on the dominance of democratic theory in the 
populace’s mind as well as the lack of any significant violent protest against government action. 
  Dahl’s conclusion of How Democratic is the American Constitution points out that the U.S. has a few 102
problems, but that one cannot expect a country to have a perfect electoral system.  He points to the spread of 
democracy along a parliamentary model instead of a presidential model to prove his critique but also his belief that 
the U.S. is adequately democratic.  He argues that the spread of democracy is a sign of the inherent democratic 
nature of the American experiment. Dahl, How Democratic, 176-7.
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Dunn asserts the claim for the hegemony of the idea of democracy in American culture, saying in 
Breaking Democracy’s Spell,  
In the societies of the West today we constantly assure one another of our 
singular good fortune in several distinct but complementary respects…we 
feel ourselves fortunate too in the political arrangements under which and 
within which we live—fortunate in their intrinsic justice ad decency…At 
least in the countries of the West, and probably now across the world as a 
whole, one salient prerequisite for improving political judgement is to 
recognize just what has recently happened to and through the still 
sometimes-charismatic but almost never classificatory term, democracy.  103
People in the West believe themselves “fortunate” for the democracy which they live under and 
consider it a cause for their high quality of life.  However, in this work Dunn argues against this 
assumed causality in an attempt to shake the unthinking faith in democracy he observes.  Dahl’s 
democracy places participation at the center for democracy’s power and success.  However, 
consistently only half of the population votes in presidential elections and less than half in mid-
term elections.   If the populace is not using the main tool of representation available to them, 104
how can theorists truthfully conclude that the United States government is accurately 
representing all interests in American society?  Providing practical leniency for such a universal 
positive statement, luck would serve as the only explanation no matter the cause of voter apathy.  
There is no explanation for how voting and representation of interests would produce the 
legitimacy for the United States government.  To go further, U.S. treatment of property rights as 
described above as one’s freedom to use and obtain property, not its distribution, raises concerns 
for the traditional Lockean conception of legitimacy on a major natural right which government 
is meant to protect.  This is a view which does not look at campaign finance, but the more 
 Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell, 1-2 and 5-6.103
 Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin, “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” 966.104
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universally relevant issue of government regulatory taking, meaning the limitations which 
government has placed on property. What remains from these contradictions, and what is built 
upon the premises which disprove both the normative and procedural argument, is Hobbes’ 
argument for government.  There is an intrinsic purpose to government that is focused on 
security which makes government legitimate regardless of any temporal dominance of a system 
of moral beliefs or institutional process of how collective decisions are made. 
 The U.S. is a legitimate government.  To make use of the definition given at the outset, 
that legitimacy requires a populace’s acceptance of coercion, the U.S. government is a legitimate 
state.  John Dunn has argued that people view democracy as a legitimate form of government.  It 
has become the commonly accepted political axiom of U.S. citizens that democracy is the only 
form of legitimate government.   When considering the practicalities of Dahl’s conception of 105
democracy the U.S. fits closely with Dahl’s model.  He does admit to a few exceptions like 
single member district plurality voting and unequal representation based on constitutional 
favoring of small states in the senate and the electoral college.  However, if the U.S. is a 
democracy, then the American people view it as legitimate given their beliefs in the inherent 
legitimacy of democracy.  While there are polls which attempt to get at this question, the 
questions only bear on the the actual performance of government and not the more fundamental 
point of U.S. government having the right to make laws.   Along with the definition it is clear 106
from recent history that the U.S. does not have a problem getting people to accept its laws.  
There have been no attempts at revolution and protests have remained peaceful and focused on 
 Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, 1-3.105
  “Trust in Government,” Gallup, accessed on January 28, 2016.106
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using the governing structure to those groups advantage.  The Occupy Wall Street movement was 
one prominent example of peaceful and lawful protest however, it was not revolutionary.   107
There is a notable exception to this general description of non-violence, which is recent and 
historical violence the African American population has demonstrated.  Recent looting of stores, 
burning of cars, and injuring of police in Baltimore, Maryland is reminiscent of previous African 
American protests like the Watts riots in 1965.   Similarly, the United States has a high 108
proportion of its population in prison relative to other countries with a rate .72 percent of its 
entire population in prison.   Accepting that some crime is inevitable, it is unsettling that 109
roughly 43 percent of prisoners are African American, that 48 percent (in 2011) of prisoners are 
in jail for drug offenses, and that 59 percent of all prisoners in jail for drug offenses are African 
American.   These numbers are disproportionate as the African American population makes up 110
only 12.9 percent of the population.  Perhaps for some segments of the U.S. population the 111
United States government is not legitimate, particularly the African American population.  Using 
the conclusion which this argument is building towards, this is perhaps the result of a lack of 
security, physical or financial, which the U.S. government and a history of legal discrimination 
which is a source for that insecurity has provided the African American population.  Ultimately, 
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York Times, April 27, 2015, accessed February 27, 2016.
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Washington Post, July 7, 2015, accessed February 27, 2016.
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the population which demonstrates such disregard for U.S. law remains a small proportion and 
thus is insignificant to the ultimate conclusion that the U.S. government is legitimate. 
 There is a large literature on voting, much of it old, but it remains relevant.   There have 
been many explanations as to why voter turnout has decreased in the United States, but there is 
consensus that voters take into account costs and benefits. All writing on the topic of voter 
turnout and its decline assumes that high voter turnout/participation is a good thing. The various 
author’s assume that the strength of democratic participation correlates somehow to government 
legitimacy. These political scientists have examined voter turnout extensively through empirical 
studies. Their results demonstrate several basic factors which describe and explain voter turnout 
in the United States. Several studies examined by Warren Miller, David Hill, and Richard Boyd 
produce clear conclusions. Demographically, the richer, more educated, and older a U.S. citizen 
is, the more likely it is that he votes.  The younger, poorer, and less educated segments of the 112
population produce the largest drag on voter turnout. It is also clear that voting calendars affect 
voter turnout generally. Boyd argues that a greater number of separate voting opportunities (like 
primary, state, and local elections) produces lower turnout, and that if there were no primaries 
voting would increase by five percent.  There are also arguments that voting has been declining 113
since 1972. However, there is some skepticism about the actual numbers which Michael 
McDonald and Samuel Popkin raise. The issue here surrounds eligible voters who are incapable 
of voting, like felons, immigrants, and overseas U.S. nationals. The U.S. census takes into 
  Warren E. Miller, “Disinterest, Disaffection, and Participation in Presidential Politics,” Political Behavior 112
2, no. 1 (1980), 24.
  Richard Boyd, “Elections, Calendars, and Voter Turnout,” American Politics Quarterly 14, no. 1/2 113
(January, 1980), 1-2; Richard Boyd, “The Effects of Primaries and Statewide Races on Voter Turnout,” Journal of 
Politics 51, no. 3 (August, 1989), 730.
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account these voters when determining turnout numbers even though they cannot physically 
vote. Therefore, turnout numbers are actually higher to the degree of about 2.5 percent.  The 114
authors argue that voting decline has been a result in an increase in these eligible voters who are 
incapable of voting.   115
 From an international perspective, David Hill found in a comparison study to other 
developed democracies that the U.S. lags in voter turnout, implying the U.S is a unique case.   116
However, differing statutory laws regarding registration and voter coercion skew the comparison. 
France’s election system is most like the U.S. and that country has comparably low voter 
turnout.  The major source of explanation for the decline within the literature is Anthony 117
Downs’ economic theory of democracy. This theory states that voters make a rational calculation 
taking into account the costs of voting, the individual benefits of voting, and the societal benefits 
of voting (civic duty).  Hill argues that registration laws, lack of accountability in the U.S. 118
government system, and reduction in electoral competition both increases the costs and decreases 
the benefits of voting.  While voter turnout has been low, Miller takes a slightly contrarian 119
view and argues that the strength of U.S. democracy may still be strong when one takes into 
 Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin, “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” American Political 114
Science Review 95, no. 4 (December, 2001), 966.
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account non-voting participation like volunteering and money contributions.  Outside of all 120
these explanations, the historian Mark Kornbluh proposes a broader social explanation which 
relies to a certain extent on the economic theory of democracy to why voter turnout has lowered. 
Since the peak of voter turnout in the late nineteenth century, a number of reforms took hold of 
the election system which de-incentivized voting. Registration became required, party power 
decreased, and the advance of the civil service system fed disinterest. The result of these changes 
was a reduction of electoral competition, the tangible benefits of voting, and an increased burden 
on the voter. Partisan loyalty decreased with the capability of splitting the ballot and the material 
gains of the spoils system were becoming extinct. The political culture also changed, as society 
became less community-centric. Reduced competition, increased disinterest, a decrease in party 
power, and societal change which deemphasized the community contributed to the sharp declines 
in voter turnout seen at the turn of the twentieth century.  The study of voter turnout has 121
produced varying fact-based explanations and solid factual descriptions of the U.S. voting 
system. There is consensus that voter’s view voting as a cost benefit scenario. However, this 
literature is lacking in principled foundations which explain its assumptions that voter turnout is 
important to democracy and the fact remains that a near majority of the population does not vote 
and so one cannot say that the U.S. is accurately representing all of society’s interests.
 Modern U.S. government has infringed upon basic property rights.  Regardless of the 
protection of property rights in the case of campaign finance, the U.S. government has allowed 
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the infringement of property rights through regulatory takings.  This is a much more pertinent 
issue for most Americans in that unlike campaign finance, which directly affects relatively few 
large donors and may marginally affect the benefits/influence one sees an individual vote as 
having on an election, regulatory takings affect nearly every American directly and in a 
substantial way.  With this in mind, large scale corporate business regulations are not taken into 
account here.  These regulations take into account the affects those uses of property will have on 
others lives and properties, and thus are potentially legitimate areas of regulation.  What is 
primarily considered are regulatory takings concerning zoning and private to private transfers 
through eminent domain.  Rigor Pilon, a scholar at the libertarian think-tank the Cato Institute, 
has provided a detailed account of this topic.  He begins by differentiating between legitimate 
and illegitimate regulatory takings, claiming that illegitimate regulatory taking occurs, 
when regulations designed to give the public various goods take otherwise 
legitimate uses an owner has in his property, thereby reducing its value, 
with no offsetting benefit, the Takings Clause, properly understood and 
applied, requires just compensation for the loss. Here, government 
regulates not to prohibit wrongful but rather rightful uses; not to prevent 
harms to others, as under scenario two, but to provide the public with 
various goods—lovely views, historic preservation, agricultural reserves, 
wildlife habitat—goods that are afforded by restricting the owner. 
Regulations prohibit the owner from using his property as he otherwise 
might—thus taking those uses—and the value of the property drops. 122
When the use of property is prohibited when that use does no harm to others that regulation does 
harm to the property owner by diminishing its value (what he can do with it) without a reciprocal 
equivalent benefit.  Such takings are illegitimate as it pertains to Lockean natural rights doctrines 
as well as the U.S. constitution which requires just compensation for takings (compensation 
 Roger Pilon, “The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights: America and Europe,” Cato Institute. 122
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being an innovation within English common law).  In dealing with such cases the Supreme Court 
has distinguished between the loss of part of a property’s value and a complete loss, saying that 
only a complete loss is covered under the takings clause.   Pilon argues that such distinctions 123
have no basis in natural rights doctrines of property.  If the government is taking what makes a 
property useful than it is infringing upon property rights.  Two instances of regulatory takings  in 
modern america which Pilon finds deeply problematic are the takings of property for blight 
reduction and the limitation of use produced by permits and zoning.   He argues that blight 124
reduction is not a proper state function which allows for regulatory taking.   However, a less 125
controversial issue that most would accept to be a clear violation of property rights is the 
regulatory taking which occurs with zoning and permits.  A classic example of this injustice 
occurred in  the 1926 case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. In this case government 
planning had zoned a portion of land for residential use which the owner had desired to sell for 
industrial development.  The value of the land dropped by 75 percent.  In a 5-4 decision the 
Supreme Court upheld the zoning decision and claimed that it was not a proper taking because 
the government was providing a public good.   This went against the former nuisance (where a 126
use of property interfered with others health or enjoyment of property) requirements for 
acceptable takings and opened up a new rationale for legitimate taking which did not rely on a 
use of property that affected others.  The government could thus take property by limiting its use, 
which is the source of its value, and do it without providing compensation.  This issue of 
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regulatory takings reappeared in the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.  In this 
case, a real estate developer purchased two parcels of land which he hoped to develop two homes 
on.  However, the South Carolina Coastal Council blocked such use because it interfered with the 
natural flora, fauna, and views of the coast which the Beachfront Management Act qualified as 
public goods.  The Supreme Court took up the case and decided on the basis that since the use/
value of the entire property was wiped out, that it was considered a taking.   The problem with 127
this is that the court still considered the public goods which the regulation aimed at as a 
reasonable motive for a regulatory taking and that partial takings through zoning and permit 
regulations remained legitimate.  These cases illustrate that property has become less of a human 
right and more of a tool for the production of free public goods.  What it demonstrates is a clear 
abuse of property rights which allows the use of property to be taken away without compensation 
and even when that use is not harmful to society.  This is important as Locke states, “The great 
and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
government, is the preservation of their property.”  In spite of the clear lack of protection for 128
property rights the American case has demonstrated, there has been little to no public concern for 
the failure to succeed in such a basic governmental purpose.  Locke is explicit in clarifying 
people’s right to absolve itself of a tyrannical government, that he does not expect people who 
become set in their ways to rebel on every usurpation of their rights.   He sees people as 129
inherently conservative and on revolutions states that, “Great mistakes in the ruling part, many 
wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people 
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without mutiny or murmur.  But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending 
the same way…it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves.”  It takes great 130
and long term abuse of government power to spark rebellion, in the meantime Locke’s tacit 
consent principle seems to keep the government legitimate.  However, the actions regarding 131
property rights attack a central pillar of the purpose of government of Locke and as the court 
cases show there has been a pattern of such behavior dating back nearly one hundred years.  
There is also the volume of economic regulations which this paper does not bring up that may in 
fact be relevant to this argument and thus would greatly expand the extent of the abuse of 
property rights.  By Locke’s logic, the U.S. government should not be legitimate and civil strife 
should result. 
 In the above discussion two different theories’ explanatory power were tested on modern 
U.S. legitimacy.  The theories explain legitimacy from two opposing angles, means and ends.  
The analysis of the modern United States dealt with three items of importance: voting, because it 
is the main tool used to represent interests which imparts legitimacy upon government for Dahl, 
property, because in classical Lockean liberalism government’s legitimacy rests not on the 
democratic process but upon government outcomes concerning the protection of natural rights, 
and a definition of legitimacy separate from the theories which deals with what legitimacy 
should look like on a practical level.  Using the relatively objective definition it became clear 
that the U.S. is a legitimate state.  However, the analysis showed that the modern U.S. neither 
  Ibid., 19:225, 191.130
  Requiring all government to be based on consent, John Locke supposes that in the absence of explicit 131
affirmation of government authority the lack of explicit denial of that right is sufficient to say that government is 
legitimate. Ibid., 8:119-20, 136-7; For more on this topic of Locke’s tacit consent see John G. Bennett, “A Note on 
Locke’s Theory of Tacit Consent,” The Philosophical Review 88, No. 2  (April, 1979), 223-34.
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accurately represents interests through voting nor protects property rights.  Thus, neither Dahl 
nor Locke is correct about state legitimacy in regards to the U.S..  To explain why the U.S. 
remains legitimate Thomas Hobbes provides guidance.  The U.S. has shown that the process of 
democracy Dahl describes is irrelevant to state legitimacy given that the U.S. does not accurately 
represent interests, as is necessary in a Dahlian conception of democracy.  The U.S. has also 
shown that classical liberal moral purposes for government are also irrelevant to legitimacy, as 
the U.S. has infringed upon property rights.  In spite of these circumstances the U.S. remains 
legitimate.  Since people can accept the infringement of their rights they necessarily can accept a 
powerful government, and because they are not concerned about government representing their 
particular interests they can accept non-democratic forms of government.  The U.S. thus 
demonstrates a strictly non-democratic government which wields absolute power over property.  
Hobbes’ formula for a legitimate state is one that ensures the security of its citizens through any 
form of government which wields absolute power.  Such is the nature of U.S. democracy as 
revealed in this paper. 
Conclusion 
 Modern democratic theorist Robert Dahl and other proceduralists have developed the 
dominant views on democratic legitimacy.  The process of collective decision-making, where 
every individual is given a voice in the process, is the essence of democracy.  For Dahl, protected 
political rights ensure that all individual interests are accurately represented in government.  It is 
the correct application of this process which produces state legitimacy.  Legitimacy allows state 
stability to exist and for societal peace to continue.  Legitimacy is essential for society in this 
respect.  The emphasis on individual interests assumes a basic human nature of survival and self 
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interest guiding a positive definition of freedom.  These are two crucial aspects guiding 
Hobbesian thought which necessitates a government with absolute power. For Dahl, absolute 
power of government is required to carry out the interests of the majority and to give the process 
value to those involved. Dahl’s political theory is fundamentally Hobbesian in these respects, and 
his democracy is Hobbes’ concept of human nature warring within the confines of democratic 
decision making. These proceduralist notions conflict with classical liberalism as John Locke 
represents it, where the legitimacy of government depends on governmental outcomes of justice 
specifically concerning the protection of natural rights.  In examining modern U.S. democracy it 
is clear that the population views the government as legitimate in the sense defined.  However, 
the U.S. neither adequately protects property rights nor accurately represents interests.  As a 
result, neither Dahl’s nor Locke’s views on legitimacy explain the result of government 
legitimacy.  However, these conclusions demonstrate that people can accept a less than pure 
democracy and a government with incredible power.  The key to a legitimate government in 
Hobbesian thought is that all forms of government can be legitimate if they retain the absolute 
power which is their right.  While not proving the most adequate form of government to be 
monarchy (as Hobbes argues), this paper does demonstrate the essence of government which 
Hobbes describes.  As a result, Dahl is incorrect with his use of process to explain legitimacy but 
correct in assuming Hobbesian premises to build his theory upon which allows his assertion of 
absolute governmental power. 
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